SINO- INDIAN RELATIONS

SINO- INDIAN RELATIONS

Introduction

1.         Sino-Indian relations have always had an impact on the balance of power in Asia.  Both the countries have played vital roles in shaping the dynamics of the Cold War in Asia.

2.         There has been deterioration in Sino-Indian relations after the conduction of nuclear tests by India.  China adopted a brazenly partisan attitude by terming India’s nuclear tests as “outrageous’ but describing Pakistan’s nuclear tests as only ‘regrettable”.

3.         China’s action in mobilising international opinion against India and campaigning for sanctions against it showed itself revealingly in solidarity with the US Administration.

Background

4.         India accorded diplomatic recognition to the Peoples Republic of China on December 30, 1949.  The Peoples Liberation  Army (PLA) made China independent through a revolution in 1949.

5.         The relations between India and China in the 1959’s were very cordial and peaceful.  In 1954, the Chinese Premier, Mr Zou En Lai visited India which led to the signing of two accords as follows:

(a)       First Accord.  India recognised Tibet as an integral part of China and considered it to be an autonomous region of China.

(b)       Second Accord.  The declaration of Panchsheel in the Joint Communique.  The Panchsheel enshrines the five principles of co-existence as follows:-

(i)        Respect for Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of all States.

(ii)       Non-Aggression.

(iii)     Non-Interference in Territorial affairs.

(iv)      Equality and Mutuality.

(v)       Peaceful Co-existance.

6.         In the late 1950’s China, occupied small portions of territory along the Indo-Tibet Frontier.  In 1962, India and China fought a war which resulted in China occupying sizeable portions of the Indian territory in the West (Ladakh and in the East (Arunchal Pradesh).

7.         The Indian Parliament passed a resolution in 1962, pledging to wage an unending struggle till the complete recovery of Indian territory from China and it also forbade cessation any occupied territory to China as part of any border settlement.

8.         In the 1970' s some efforts were made by India to normalise relations with China.

9.         In the 1980’s more efforts were made to normalise the relations.  The real break-through in the relations between the two countries came during the path-breaking visit undertaken by Mr Rajiv Gandhi in 1988.

10.       The 1990’s saw a beginning of the ‘detente’ in the context of changing equations in the global scenario.

11.       China’s President, Mr Jiang Zemin visited in November 1997.  This was the first ever visit by a Chinese Head of the State to India. Four agreements were signed during the visit.

Border Dispute

12.       Background. The 4060 km long Sino-Indian border has been the bone of contention between the two countries.  The border dispute goes back the Shimla Conference of 1914 when the representative of British India, Tibet and China met.  it was decided in the conference that:

(a)       Tibet was an autonomous country.

(b)       The Mcmahon Line would be the boundary between India and Tibet.

(c)       Chinese sovereignty of some sort would extend over Tibet.

13.       At the 1914 conference the representatives of India and Tibet signed the agreement, China did not, then dispute the Mcmahon Line.

14.       The Indo-China-Tibet boundary or the McMahon Line in the East and the boundary (Aksai Chin) along Ladakh in the West remained a boundary by usage and understanding. The result was that the precise boundary was not demarcated, leading to border skirmishes in 1962 and the Chinese penetration into the Sumdurung Chu Valley of Arunachal Pradesh in 1986.

15.       The Main Areas of the Border Dispute.  The Mc Mahon Line is not recognised by China.

16.       The integration of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh into India is also not recognised by China.

17.       India’s Position.

(a)       The border in the West should remain at the 1959 position thereby implying that it does not recognise China’s claim over Aksai Chin.  The northern borders of Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim correspond to the McMahon Line and hence the boundary.

(b)       India also holds that China is in Posession of Indian territory which it occupied during the 1962 conflict.

(c)       The territory west of Karakoram within Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) belongs to India and has been illegally ceeded by Pakistan to China.

18.       Talks to Resolve the Border Dispute.  In 1993, during the visit of former Indian Prime Minister, Mr Narasimha Rao, the Sino-Indian Accord to establish peace and tranquility along the LAC (Line of Actual Control) was signed.  Both countries declared an end of possible air violations of the border by their military planes.

19.       The meeting of the experts from both sides laid foundation for a dialogue by the Sino-Indian Joint Working Group (JWG), the apex body negotiating the final settlement of the border dispute.

20.       The meeting of the JWG is expected to be held soon to move ahead with the resolution of the border dispute.

20.             The agreement of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) signed during the visit by the Chinese President to India in 1997 reiterates the determination of both sides to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement of the boundary question.

Irritants in Sino-Indian Relations

22.       The overt and covert military assistance provided by China to Pakistan is the biggest impediment in improving Sino-Indian relations.  The Sino-Pakistan collusion in the nuclear field is seen as China’s long term strategy in gaining supremacy in Asia.

23.       China looks at India as a serious rival to its monopoly in Asia and hence India’s efforts to emerge as a regional power are thwarted.  The clandestine help to Pakistan is seen as a part of China’s strategy to check India.

24.       Presently China has joined hands with the US and others in internationalising the Kashmir issue to embarass India.

25.       The non-resolution of Aksai Chin and other boundary disputes.  China has laid claim to 90,000 square kms of Arunachal Pradesh.

26.       China has built military bases in Tibet and Myanmar which are seen by India as a threat to its national security.

27.       Beijing Meet.  The 11th round of Joint Working Group (JWG) talks were held in Beijing on April 26 and 27, 1999.  The Indian side was led by the Foreign Secretary, Mr K, Raghunath, while the Chinese side was headed by a Vice-Foreign Minister, Mr. Yand Wenchang.  the last  JWG meeting was held in August 1997.

28.       Bilateral Relations.  Both the countries felt that there was considerable scope for developing and expanding bilateral relations in economic, commercial and other fields.

29.       Role in the New World Order.  As two large countries and neighbours India and China had important role to play in shaping the emerging new world order, the Panchsheel initiated by the India and China should form the basis for inter-State relations universally.

30.       Line of Actual Control (LAC).  Both the sides reviewed the situation along the  LAC in the border areas, with each side providing clarification sought by the other.  However, they were not nearer to any solution to the vexed problem of delineating the LAC and related matters.  The LAC and related matters have been part of the JWG agenda ever since it was set up.

31.       Nuclear Issue.  For the first time India directly explained to China its nuclear doctrine of minimum credible deterrence.  China reiterated its basic position on India’s nuclear explosions.

32.       Sino-Pak Nuclear Co-operation. India raised the question of China’s continuing support to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programme. China replied that its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan was confined to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and that this was carried our under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA).

33.       Kosovo Crisis. India and China shared the common view that if the West is allowed to have its way in Kosovo, a precedent would be set where by the sovereignty of any country, big or small can be breached with impunity.

34.       Expert Groups.  A meeting of expert groups from the two countries will be held in a few months time in order to keep the dialogue process on track.

Reasons for Resumption of Dialogue by China

35.       India’s Positive Attitude.  Analysts feel that the positive attitude shown by India especially by the External Affairs Minister Mr. Jaswant Singh was taken note of by China.

36.       India’s Engagement With Other Nations.  India’s positive engagement with other nations, bilaterally and at the multilateral fora may have forced China to resume dialogue with India.

37.       Diplomatic Effort.  The persistent efforts of diplomats in China and India also bore fruit.

38.       Peace and Tranquility along the Border.  Analysts feel that China must be interested in peace and Tranquility in its border with India in view of the uncertainty in the EastAsian region.

39.       China’s Deterriorating Relations with US.  China’s relations with the US have worsened in recent times which could also be one of the reasons behind China’s changed attitude towards India.

Need for Improved Sino-Indian Relations

40.       Security Concerns.  Analysts opine that India and China should address their respective security concerns frankly and openly.  This will allow the two Asian giants to rebuild their relations.  The two countries can play a vital role in shaping the new world order.

41.       Economic Relations.  Trade between the two countries was nearly $ 4.5 billion.  china has asked for India’s support in its bid to join the World Trade Organisation.

42.       Peace and Stability in Asia.  Long term peace and stability in Asia will depend on improved Sino-Indian relations.  This will require a basis for each other’s mutual concern.

Suggestions to Improve Sino-Indian Relations

43.       Diplomacy.  The current slump in Sino-India relations can be overcome by some deft diplomacy.  The two sides should address issues relevant for a stable and long-term relationship.

44.       Transparency in Relations.    The current situation demands a greater need for transparency in the Sino-Indian relations.  Both the sides must explore each others geo-strategic perceptions.

45.       Co-operative Relationship.  India and China can benefit a lot from a cordial and co-operative relationship rather than engaging in needless confrontation.  Sino-Indian co-operation was the key factor in preventing the US from dominating the Kyoto Conference on global warming.

46.       Common Interests on Global Issues.  India and China have more common interests on global issues than the US and China.  Such common issues of mutual interest should be identified for enhanced co-operation in the global arena.

47.       Confidence Building Measures.  Finally, both sides need to start bilateral talks on enhancing the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and the resolution of the long pending boundary disputes.

Conclusion

48.       The resumption of the Sino-Indian dialogue was significant as it ended a year-long bitterness in the bilateral relationship.  For the first time both sides discussed issues like China’s support to pakistan’s nuclear programme and India’s Nuclear doctrine.

49.       India needs to develop a long-term view of its ties with China on the basis of its interests and experiences.  India should follow a policy of measured non-conforntation avoiding irrelevant tensions without compromising  any aspect of its national interest and integrity.

50.       India and China seem to have realised that renewed dialogue and restoration of ties to a reasonable level will help in moving forward on the vast agenda taken up by the JWG.  Normalisation of bilateral relations is a key for India and China to play a crucial role in shaping the new world order.