Rhetoric of State Ideology and Ethnic Identity in Nepal

Rhetoric of State Ideology and Ethnic Identity in Nepal

Ramesh K. Limbu1( from journal of indigenous people, 2071)

Abstract

This paper observes the rhetoric of state ideology that was enforced by the rulers and ruling class people in the name of ruling system, and then inspects its impact on ethnic identity in Nepal. In so doing, it fi rst draws discourses on nation building and then looks at the relationships connecting ruling and non-ruling class people. Second, it examines how the Nepali State ideology was singly adopted, rhetorically implied and forcefully endorsed by the group of people in State power as a common or national principle, policy and legal provision, and thereby resulting in a skewed representation of minority ethnic groups in the entire domain of governance– including domain of policy making and bureaucracy. Third, the construction of Nepali indigenous identity is viewed through the complex and dynamic questions of ethnic identity and state ideology and the perspectives of disjunctures and differences between non-ethnic and ethnic, dominant and dominated, privileged and under privileged/marginalized communities. Finally, ethnicity in the context of Nepal is further elaborated paying attention on Kiranti-Limbu ethnicity.
Key words
rhetoric, ethnic identity, nation building, ideology  

Introduction

 Nepal was evolved as a multiethnic, multicultural, multilingual and multireligious country at least since its inception. The nature of this multi-ness seems to have grown subsequently. National Population Census (2011) has recorded 125 different nationalities and 123 languages. Nepal has thus been a home for different caste and indigenous ethnic people as they have been cultivating distinctive culture, language, religion, history, tradition and mythology. This reality of multiplicity was
1 Limbu is a Lecturer in English at Pindeshwor Campus, Nepal Sanskrit University. He is also a research Grantee from NFDIN and UGC on indigenous knowledge system and Limbu cultural identity. He has recently completed his PhD in English from Tribhuvan University.
relinquished in the name of nationalism, and imposed culture, language and religion of the only ruling class people upon all communities. Due to the process of religious and cultural homogenization of Nepal (till 1990) with an absolute monarchy – that symbolized the fusion of state with nation–“did not allow inter-ethnic tension to surface on the ground” (Dastider 1995: i). The identity issues of ethnic or indigenous minorities was started only after the People’s Movement of 1990 as a subject of discourse and the Second People’s Movement-2006 has further opened up the ground for wider debate of social inclusion. The issue and nomenclature of janajatis, minorities, nationalities and indigenous ethnicity has thus become polemical resulting in discursive modes between caste and ethnicity. Before this, the ethnicity was taken as sub-caste or jati, a language of fi gurative signifi cation, non-referential, a subordinating and derogatory term used only to the aim of persuasion. The term ethnicity has been, “a nebulous concept; it is confusing and complex… relegating ethnic identities to a merely symbolic status” (Regmi 2003: 5). While talking of Nepali ethnicity, it appears to be more ambiguous, euphemistic and rhetorical tending to bear multiple levels of underlying implications. Such mystifying inferences then raise the question how the socio-political rhetoric of ruling class constituted the past, the present and the future of Nepal as belonging only to them. And such logic of distinction has resulted in “a mere oratory rhetoric” (Lama 2009: vii) which helped make such unstable identities causing to be so elusive, slippery, and amorphous and socially constructed. This paper at this juncture tries to observe the role of state ideology for shaping of Nepali ethnic identity.
Discourses on Nation Building In relation to the State formation and/or nation building, the historical accounts of Nepal can invite several issues generating a number of discourses. Offi cial written history of Nepal was kept on the limit of genealogy of ruling dynasties, focusing mainly on valourization of monarchs, governing authorities and national unifi cation. Due to “the domination of the Indo-Nepal[i]s in the country, ethnic populations, as well as low castes, were rejected for a long time as marginal and prevented from holding any kind of infl uential function, and also from writing a history of their own” (Schlemmer 2004:119). As the formulation of history and the interpretation of culture of Nepal have been very much “the construct of dominant castes”, the socio-cultural discussion of the country has remained “a monologue with no voices from below” (Gurung 496). Until recently, notes Harka Gurung (2003:496), “the marginal groups or the ethnic minorities had neither the intellectual resource nor the freedom of expression to record or present their viewpoint”. Records of minority groups’ histories were squarely undermined and remained mostly in oral texts.  The State recorded the history of Nepal on the basis of its own ideology. The terms state, nation, nationalism and national intergration are often used interchangeably. A nation state must fulfi ll certain obligations, of which the qualifi cations of sovereignty, independence and fi xed territorial expressions are essential. A state is defi ned as an objective reality in a society having a legal and territorial expression of people organised under one governmemt. The state derives its authority by “legitimate coercion” (Rejai and Enloe 1977: 93). Hans Kohn, in The
Idea of Nationalism (1967), defi nes a nation as a “state of mind, an act of consciousness … the individual’s identifi cation of himself with ‘We group’ to which he/she gives supreme loyalty” (2). The idea of a nation, therefore, is a kind of consciousness relating to subjective values like race, religion, language, culture, traditions and such other common behaviours of people in a society. According to Anant Raj Poudyal (2013:41), the meaning of nationalism is “assertions of citizenary rights in the affairs of state.” Nationalism is related to the consciousness of sacrifi ces made in the past and willingness to make further ones in the future. State building is said to be the concentration of authority, maintenance of law and order, and an establishment of a rational administrative system. Nation-building thus “springs from the awakening of tribes, communities and peoples to the consciousness of common historical process. It is tied by habits of communication of language, lineage, religion, history and shared destiny” (Dahal 2006: 9). The main credit for initiation of modern state building of Nepal is given to Prithvi Narayan Shah, the then king from the house of Gorkha, who after invading most of the principalities and petty kingdoms declared Kathmandu as the capital in 1768. Prior to the unifi cation of Nepal as its present form, about two and half scores of small principalities and autonomous kingdoms had their separate existences with their own separate administrative boundaries and self-identifi cations. For an instance, as other chiefs or kings did in other communities and regions, many Limbu community-heads and/or chiefs in Limbuwan or Pallo 'far' Kirant used to practice their own self-right, maintaining their autonomous rule within their forts and territories and had various kinds of indigenous skills and knowledge systems practiced therein. There was less linguistic and cultural variation and characterized more to the nature of homogeneity. Even though political boundaries would shift time to time, the question of self-identifi cation was ingrained in their collective efforts and functional activities. The existence of Baisi Rajyas (twenty-two kingdoms) in Gandaki region and Chaubisi Rajyas (twenty-four kingdoms) in Karnali regions, three kingdoms in Kathmandu valley, and Chaudandi, Makawanpur and Bijaypur, (Wallo Kirant, Majh Kirant and Pallo Kirant) etc. had their own separate political identifi cations. As a result of Prithvi Narayan Shah’s ambitious acts, those principalities were brought under a single nation known as Nepal. Some historians and scholars have hailed Prithvi Narayan Shah as a far-sighted king and some others critiqued as a shrewd ruler in terms of constructing nationalist identity through the use of political rhetorics like ‘unity in diversity,’ ‘yam between two boulders,’ ‘garden of four castes and thirty-six sub-castes,’ and so on. His rhetoric that ‘Nepal is a garden of four castes and 36 sub-castes’ itself is “a distinct example of denial of people outside the caste system and creation of fi ctive national identity” (Regmi 2003; Upadhyay 2010:4). The historians’ judgments on Prithvi Narayan and his successors including Baburam Acharya “were so much laudatory [ones] that, though often valuable in other respects, reads more like propaganda than sober history” (Whelpton 2005:viii). Mahesh C. Regmi (1976:89) has expressed a mild skepticism on “whether the Dibya Upadesh really had been dictated by Prithvi Narayan himself.” The rulers of Gorkha unifi ed scores of independent political units into one state “forging the new
kingdom of Nepal and marking the transition from an era of petty states (diversifi ed power) to an era of nation-building” (Pradhan 2009: xxvi). Through unifi cation campaign of King Prithvi Narayan Shah, Nepal was unifi ed as a single state but it is also true that it is not the absolute Gorkha conquest of all the principalities and kingdoms symmetrically. The territorial expansion of Nepal was achieved also through diplomacy, wiliness and conquest. The Gorkhalis resorted to various measures that “ranged from induction as followers (Magar, Gurung), accommodation with kipat concession (Limbu, Rai), labour exploitation (Tamang), and vengeance (Kirtipur Newars)” (Gurung 2005:5056) during an act of nation building process. Beside conquest, many other strategies were also used for annexation of those kingdoms into the present unifi ed State of Nepal, i.e., through utilization of various terms and conditions, policies and strategies such as establishing relationship of ritual friendship (miteri), tying knot of in-laws (sasural), and signing in treaties and providing territorial autonomy. These strategies, one way or the other, strongly helped them bring substantial success in annexing most of the seminal and valued territories into the Nepal state. For an instance, Limbuwan of the farther eastern region of Nepal had got a distinctive nature of land provision called Kipat system of tenure inherited from their ancestors and restored the right to autonomy as a result of the treaty between Shah Kings and Limbus. Limbus had retained this privilege as Limbuwan was incorporated into Nepal state through negotiation, not of conquest. This is, for Kumar Pradhan (2009: 8), “a most signifi cant event which deserves [special] attention for a proper understanding of the history of Nepal.” In the process of nationalization, the unifi er King Prithivi Narayan Shah called Nepal a ‘asali Hindustan’ (pure land of Hindus), the use of religious cum political rhetoric indicating that the state’s roadmap of national integration under the Shah regime was guided by Hindu polity. The Hindu polity in which “monarchy and religion have decisive roles was further enacted more rigidly during the Rana period (1846-1951)” (Hachhethu 2003:2). Likewise, King Shah also called Nepal ‘a garden of four varna (castes) and thirty-six sub-castes’ which might mean that he intended to integrate all subjects into the fold of Hinduism. Or else, the question rises, which were/are the thirty-six sub-castes? Do they fall under four hierarchical caste system of Hinduism or not? If the answer is ‘Yes’ then he was taking assimilationistic move and if the answer is ‘No’ then he was guided by the feeling of nationalism. Whatever the reason may there be, the credit for unifying (also some people call merging of territory) of petty kingdoms and principalities into Nepal. But the rulers after him failed to unite or integrate all the communities socially, culturally, religiously and above all pragmatically. According to Dev Raj Dahal (2006), the Panchayat system (1960-1990) invented welfare-based soft authoritarian state. It had utilized “muscular and authoritarian methods including cooptation and isolation of elites to manage dissent and resolve confl ict” which was a class-bridging state where locus of power hovered around the central axis and the monarchy Panchayat regime also “encouraged the Nepalization of language and culture and Sanskritization of non-Sanskritic groups to neutralize the tide of capitalism and communism in the neighborhood” (Dahal13). In this system,
opening a political party was a crime against the state and only people who confi rmed to the state sanctioned ideology were permitted to sit in the Panchayat. For Harka Gurung, “The formation of Nepal as a hegemonic State out of congeries of tribal territories in mid-18th century had a theocratic basis” (2). Consequently, autonomy of local ruling system was lost after the invasion of the principalities into greater Nepal. The self rule practiced earlier by those kingdoms and principalities was seized after the territorial annexations. Political power was centralized in the hands of Shah Kings. Administrative authorities went to the jurisdiction and custody of Hindu caste people. Others became powerless and subordinated politically and socially. Conceived as a Hindu haven against Mughal (Muslim) menace, Harka Gurung contends, this State ideology became entrenched after the British (Christian) expansion in India. Brahmin orthodoxy was elevated to “dominance as a bulwark” against such alien religions. Thus, Hinduisation became “the raison d’etre of the Nepalese state with its national identity rooted in the image of hill (Parbate) high castes and their mother tongue (Parbate/Nepali)” (Gurung 2). Society was organized on the basis of a hierarchical caste system whose distinctive feature was “exclusiveness based on ritual status with reference to marriage and diet” (ibid.). To make it more effective, pundits of the Brahmin caste were appointed in all provincial and district level courts, as representatives of dharmadhikari2 who were responsible for applying the law and religion in all relevant cases simply ignoring the justice system, “the principle of equality” (Thapa 2010:921). But prior to unifi cation, people were culturally liberal and no cultural boundaries were drawn upon them.  They had their own kind of traditional religious faiths and belief systems. Nature and natural phenomena were the guiding elements on which they had profound respect and faith on animism and naturalism. Commonality was the chief factor for public, social, cultural and religious measures. Nature and the land were determining attribute of the native people. Religious and cultural activities were conducted under the tradition and values of oral system. Written forms had secondary place but oral form was more worth bearing. But after unifi cation of the country, new systems were enforced upon the indigenous minorities as per the state ideology guided by Hindu orthodoxy.  Richard Burghart (1984) notes that the monarchy provided different categories of land grants to diverse sections of people for their livelihoods and loyalty, such as tributary kings of the Gorkhali Kingdom (rajya), military offi cers (jagir), civil administrators (nankar), tenant cultivators (raikar), servants and artisans in the court (jagir), religious associations (guthi), individual persons, such as saints, Brahmins, priests, war widows (birta) and Rais and Limbus of eastern Nepal (kipat) and provided them access to the Royal court (Burghart 103). King Prithvi Narayan Shah wanted to create a socially and culturally embedded state and utilized the existing social, cultural and intellectual resources to protect Nepal mandala, “the spiritual and material universe of the Nepali nation-state” (Dahal 11). Dahal further notes: […] the rule of Rana oligarchy over a century (1846-1949) created an extractive patrimonial state. Compared to Shah rulers who negotiated power with elites from

2 Religious authority

diverse society for a nation-state, the Rana regime monopolized the state power within family circles and high caste elites … framed and executed muluki ain (civil code) of 1854 to foster vertical integration of society based on caste hierarchy and patriarchy and annual pande pajani, the distribution of lands and titles to various groups of people to seek loyalties to their order. (Dahal 2006:12) Dahal observes that in the democratic experiments of the 1950s, “political parties tried to link nationalism to political modernization and attempted to redefi ne group boundaries on the basis of ideology rather than ethnicity, religion and region” (2006:27, 2010:13). The Muluki Ain (Civil Code), amended and abridged by Chandra Shumsher in 1910, institutionalized “the hierarchically based caste system by dividing the Nepal[i] society into various order and the system of annual Pajani and land grants and other facilities defi ned their attachment to the state” (Dahal 7). Harka Gurung expresses his grievances on the issue of unity in diversity. He is with the view that even though Nepal was brought together “territorially” by means of the Gorkha conquest, it has not been unifi ed “psychologically and economically even after more than two centuries” (Gurung 2003). This is partly because the Nepali state was captured and exploited by a small elite castes group since its formation. The small ruling elites dominated society by “concentrating most of the state power at the center. Even the democratic polity envisioned by the 1990 Constitution was highly centralized. The state was unitary” (Lawoti 2007: 15-16). Prior to unifi cation, people of those kingdoms and territories had little, if not none, feeling of subjugation and subordination as they used to enjoy common political autonomy and collective thoughts and conscientious. Indeed, ruling mechanisms were simple, accessible and hence easily addressable. Confl icts and misunderstandings were solved in understanding of the two confl icting sides under mediation of certain local and state council. The feeling of social, cultural, linguistic and religious disparity and differences were outlined only after the Hindu interventions. They used to feel parity among one another although they preferred to observe distinctive traditional culture and rituals. But aftermath of unifi cation, the ruling group defi ned the rights and duties of citizens by confl ating it with its own interests and adopting political institutions that concentrated power within the group. This disjuncture between the state and society is “the underlying cause for the eruption of many of the contentious activities in present day Nepal” (Lawoti 8; Gurung, 2003). The Country Code of 1854 introduced by Jang Bahadur Rana was the fi rst national code of modern Nepal based on “Hindu jurisprudence that had incorporated the diverse caste system and ethnic groups of Nepal in the framework of a national caste hierarchy [and] legalized caste-based discrimination” (de Sales 2000, cited in Thapa 2010:921). It remained the main source of law in Nepal for 110 years until 1963 when it was replaced by the Country Code (Muluki Ain) of 1963. According to Krishna Hachhethu (2003), the Hinduisation process in Nepal followed the structure of casteism. The caste system previously regulated by hokum (order or command) of the King and bachan (instruction) of the priests was standardised into state law by the Rana rulers. The Civil Code 1854 classifi ed the people in three broad categories in a descending order: (a) Tagadhari (sacred-thread wearing castes) at the top (b) Matwali
(alcohol drinking castes and ethnic groups) in the middle, and (c) Sudra (impure but touchable) and Acchut (impure and untouchable castes) at the lowest position. For Hachhethu, “Putting ethnic groups into the fold of a Hindu-based hierarchical caste system, suggested a model of excessive Hinduisation” (3). The fi rst civil code of Nepal brought all the indigenous people into the Hindu hierarchical fold that “categorized the Indigenous Peoples into enslavable and non-slavable matwalis or alcohol drinking communities” (Lawoti 6). The civil code has further ushered “a mono-cultural nationalism, through one language, one religion, and one dress” giving a legal status to “cultural imperialism” which not only de-cultured the several indigenous cultures that existed in the society, but also “marginalized their status socially, politically, economically and religiously. The homogenizing process that followed [not only] failed to recognize the very diversity present in the society, [but also] promoted legalized inequality” (Upadhyay 5-6). Even though it “recognized and accepted some degree of cultural diversity, it translated cultural differences into hierarchical ‘caste’ categories” (Pradhan 9; Upadhyay 2010: 6). Kanak Bikram Thapa (2010) opines that even if the Country Code of 1963 was based on the principle of legal equality, removing caste and religious consideration and abolishing all types of discrimination and untouchability it remained stick to a single culture, single language, and “prohibited converting another person from one religion to another” (924). Education system was based on the language and culture of the dominant Parbatiyas rather than of other groups within the population. Banning of the oral communication in minority languages even in the school playground was the policy so that “other languages will gradually disappear and greater national strength and unity will result” (Nepal National Education Planning Commission 1955: 96). In Nepal, six constitutions have been promulgated since 1948 and a seventh constitution is currently under construction by the constituent assembly but “they did not mention anything about religious freedom or anything regarding any religion” which “many (especially non-Hindus) oppose such a restriction and consider it a mockery” (Thapa 921-925). Similarly, education during the Rana rule was the privilege of the rulers and religious leaders. The Ranas feared educated public, and therefore, “kept education the exclusive prerogative of the ruling elite [while] the rest of the population remained largely illiterate”. The organized and formal education for the common masses was a taboo in the Rana oligarchy, as they were “least interested in nation building” endeavour (Upadhyay 6).
in the most general sense, can be regarded as “a form of mental or emotional energy imparted to a communication to affect a situation in the interest of the speaker” (Kennedy 2007: 7). State ideology refers to the set of ideas, policies, ideals and shared comprehensive thinking adapted and endorsed by the group of people in State power in order to give normative (or false) impression. Such ideology is legitimatized through various course of actions and then applied as a common or national principle, policy and legal provision. Such ideology has to do with “any social super-structure, with any expression of interests, values, beliefs and unconscious drives” (Markovic 1984:71). After the unifi cation of Nepal, Prithvi Narayan Shah, and those after him, based the country’s unifi cation on four key ideas: “the unquestioning power and authority of the Hindu King of Gorkha; the supremacy of the Hindu ethos in national life; social integration through Hindu social system based on caste divisions; and recognition of Nepali as the language of government, administration and in more recent time, education” (Sharma 1978:7, Hachhethu 2003:3). State ideology turned into an art of persuasion. The people in power apparatus of the State created such narratives that were instrumental to persuading general public with their own ideas, opinions and strategies. These ideologies included some basic assumptions that helped make it as natural, just and right. The Hindu polity placed the King as “a sovereign lord, a protector of territory and subjects, a guardian of moral order, an upholder of traditions, and the source of all spiritual and temporal power” (Sharma 1997:475, Hachhethu 4). Though Civil Code of 1963 formally withdrew State’s support to caste system, the Panchayat regime, in a reformed way, continued the State's policy of promoting Hinduism in various forms (Hachhethu 3). For instance, the Panchayat regime devised a set of national symbols: the crown, scepter, royal crest, royal standard, coat of arms, cow, national fl ag, pheasant, rhododendron, and red blob are all ‘symbolic of Hindu dominance’ (Gurung 1997:505). This ruling ideology simply distorted or obscured power relations by playing such a role and demonstrating activities that their assumptions were normal or just. They were apt at what aspects of viewpoints are to be highlighted, and what are to be excluded in order to give normative or false ideological impression. The State ideology of Nepal incorporated a range of activities and practices guided by Hindu religious, nationalistic, socio-political and cultural, functional, philosophical ideals and assumptions, linguistic and legal practices of the only dominant ruling elites. As a result, the structure of political opportunities in Nepal has been “unduly favourable to Brah[mins] and Chhetris as against other castes and ethnic groups” (Pathak 2005:126). In the history of 250 years, says Pathak, “we fi nd that they were able to capture more than 80 percent of the senior-most positions in all political, executive, judiciary, legislative, and security dimensions” (ibid.). These kinds of acts have widened up the gap between the group of rulers and the ruled. While forming such ideology, the State ruling elites would create an environment to include the questions such as which term of binary had to be privileged and which ones were to be repressed or devalued. What cultural assumptions and what type of myths’ construction would help shape forming such ideology? What ones were mystifi ed and demystifi ed? Similarly, what enthymemes have been utilized in the ‘logic’ of the text and context creation? What styles of presentation were utilized and how did it contribute to the meaning construction of the text? What vision of human possibility appears to lie at the heart of the understanding of the ideology? Such kind of ideology has engendered confl icting discourses in terms of privileged and underprivileged groups in the State apparatus. According to William F. Fisher, there are two different competing views of difference found in national culture of Nepal at the heart of the debate on formation of identities. One portrays a democratic Hindu kingdom composed of a
harmonious fl ower garden of four varnas and 36 jats which share a heroic past, speak a common language, follow a common religion, and are led, at least symbolically, by a divine and benevolent king. A second view opposes a Nepali past of internal colonization, Hindu oppression and the forced assimilation of non-Hindu minorities into a hierarchical system, to an emergent vision of Nepal as a nation in the making. In his view, if this “nation in the making” is to achieve nationhood at all, “can only do so as a culturally plural and secular society” (Fisher 2001:4). Ideology naturalizes, it historicizes, and it eternalizes the structures and affairs of the State. In this case, structure of ideology is made to appear as natural according to the order of things; as historical according to chronological development, and as eternal wherein thinking that the state of affairs will be/go that way. In the context of Nepal, “People were made to believe that caste inequality and difference of status was preordained fact governed by ‘Karma and Dharma3,’” (Regmi 4) and nothing could be done to change it in this life. This belief was made being ingrained in the people in such a way that they, “in their hope to attain a better position in their next life, toiled hard and never questioned the hegemony” (Regmi 4; Upadhyay 4). Apart from this, the premise of many historical, educational and literary texts dwelled on creation and recreation of such ideology supports for legitimating the destiny by birth. According to Miliband, the State was run by a series of interconnected state elites, (the political elite, the civil service elite, the judicial elite and the military elite), but these elites were, in turn, extremely likely to be infl uenced by the bourgeoisie and to make policy decisions accordingly. Until recently, the control of state ruling elites can be seen in every social, political, cultural, linguistic, religious and legal sphere of Nepal. Article 4 of the 1990 Constitution conceded that Nepal is a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual country but it declared Nepal as only a Hindu Kingdom. The conduct of multiplicity “remained only in rhetoric as this Constitution limits the very rights of Nepal's numerous indigenous and economically backward groups [and] the state has used political suppression, military oppression, social exclusion and economic marginalization to undermine the development of Nepal's indigenous and marginalized groups” (Lama xxvi). Indigenous and marginalized people have no decisive roles in politics, judiciary, executive, civil service and administration in modern Nepal (Baral 1993, Hachhethu 2000 and Pandey 2001). They lack participation in all spheres of governance including “policy making having extremely low participation in politics which have resulted [in] a very low socio-cultural and economic status” (Lama 18). The strategy of elite state ruling ideology has resulted in a skewed representation of minority ethnic groups in the entire domain of governance in Nepal. Pradhan and Roy (2006:60) contend it opining that so-called upper castes such as “brahmins (priests), thakuris (rulers) and newars (the indigenous linguistic group of Nepal’s Kathmandu valley) hold important positions in the civil service, education and military, all of which have less than 5% representation from the indigenous ethnic communities.” The prevailing constitutional Hindu religious ruling system is
3 Here, Karma denotes individual’s ‘duty or destiny’ and Dharma refers to ‘intrinsic ethics or pious act’ associated with one’s destiny and the God. responsible for “the reason of not getting freedom from our country’s dire poverty and reciprocal racial oppression” (Yakkharai 299). Instead of maintaining the parallel coexistence of multiple identities of diverse communities, the country’s constitutions until 1990 defi ned it “as a Hindu nation and Nepali as the state language” (Pradhan & Roy 60). Moreover, the execution of Hindu religious state ideology has stimulated disputing views. Those claiming that Nepal ought to remain a Hindu state point to these features of Hinduism as “assimilative and accommodative”, while, those opposing this view dub these trends “as exploiting ethno-religious minorities and threatening their very existence” ((Pradhan and Roy 65). In Contentious Politics in Democratizing Nepal, Mahendra Lawoti (2007) has a view that till the abolishment of the caste system in 1963, the legal system treated different ethnic and caste groups unequally, perpetuating inequality. Many opportunities such as education and jobs were not available to marginalized groups, and for the same crime the ‘low caste’ groups were punished more severely (Levine 1987, Bista 1991, Hofer 1979, cited in Lawoti 9). He says further that the end of the caste system juridically during the Panchayat by King Mahendra was a step forward but the Panchayat system undermined different native languages, religions, and cultures through its assimilation policies. It promoted one religion, language and values in a multicultural society. The Panchayat promoted the ‘upper caste hill Hindu’ culture and values in the façade of modernization and development (Lawoti 9). According to Lawoti, the hill Hindu religious state ideology promoted by the pre 1990 Shah and Rana rulers was continued, though to a lesser extent, even in the democratic period. Even though 1990 ushered in extensive democratic rights, the marginalized ethnic and caste groups continued to face cultural discrimination and political exclusion. The 1990 Constitution defi ned the Kingdom as ‘multiethnic, multilingual’ but the other articles and state institutions it adopted discriminated against marginalized ethnic and caste groups (Lawoti 2005, Gurung et al. 2000, Bhattachan 2000, Neupane 2000). Not only was the state declared Hindu by the Constitution but the native languages and different cultures of indigenous nationalities and madhesi incurred unequal treatment by the state. Ethnic parties were banned and minority rights were not recognized or protected. The dalit, indigenous nationalities, madhesi and women faced many other forms of legal and social discrimination (Bhattachan 1999, Biswakarma 2000, FWLD 2000, Serchan 2001, Lawoti 2007:10). In the view of Krishna Hachhethu, the 1990 Constitution of Nepal upheld a number of features of Hindu-based nationalization including the offi cial title of Nepal as a Hindu state. Moreover, the constitutional provision for the separation of politics from ethnicity and religion, the prohibition of cow slaughter, ban on proselytizing and restriction to fundamental rights were employed for safeguarding the tradition of Hindu supremacy. Constitutional position of the Nepali state and nation, and the recognition of Nepal as multi-ethnic and multi-lingual seemed contradictory. The refusal to identify it as “a multi-religious state exposed the ambiguity and contradiction of the Constitution, and pave[d] the way for the struggle against the identifi cation of the modern state of Nepal with one particular religion” (Hachhethu 4-5). The 1990 Constitution has, at least on paper, given a degree of offi cial recognition to the
ethnic affi liations, “they certainly did not have in the institutions or ideology of the preceding Panchayat regime” (Gellner 6).
Contingency of Ethnic Identity The interim constitution of Nepal 2007 states that Nepal is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-religious, multi-cultural country. The coexistence of distinct communities such as Limbu, Rai, Gurung, Tamang, Magar, Newar, Sherpa, Tharu, Kõits Sunuwar, Dhanuwar, Yakkha, Dhimal, Satar, Koche, Meche, Chepang, Raute, Chhetri, Brahmin, etc. has added uniqueness to its diversity. Observing the very diversity of caste and ethnic people, Giuseppe Tucci (1962) has noted that “the ethnographical study of Nepal, despite the many researches undertaken, is still one of the most complexes in the world” (76). Harka Gurung (2004) proclaims that, “Ethnic groups are mostly Mongoloid and speak Tibeto Burman languages. On the other hand, most caste people are Caucasoid and speak Indo-Aryan languages” (49). When looked at the size of population, all castes and ethnic groups of Nepal are minorities. Even Chhetri community which constitutes the largest one is just 16.6 percent (Census 2011). Analyzing the data of CBS 2002, Hachhethu and others conclude that  “The identities of majority are generally defi ned in terms of the Nepali language, which is the dialect of 48.6 percent of the population, and Hindu religion [which] is 80.6 percent of the population” (63). In actuality, every community desires to be a leading group and no community people desire to become an ethnic minority people. As many other identities, ethnic identity also embodies the characteristics of change, fl uidity and fl eeting. For instance, as other communities, Limbu minority group of eastern Nepal possesses multiple identities. Historically, Limbus were known as descendent of Kirant dynasty. Later on, they were hāngs or kings of their territories, chautariyas ‘Prime ministers’ of their land, heads of communities, villages, forts and regions, Subhas or Subbas of Kipat lands, lahoreys in the British and Indian armies and so on. They were also known as wanderers and hunters, hill and mountain dwellers, indigenous knowledge holders, users of medicinal herbs and spices, physicians and architects; nature worshipers and animists, and native land owners. Apart from this, in the national, modern and global worldview, they were also characterized as Mongoloids, tribes, Nepali jati or janajatis, matawalis, native or indigenous people, minorities, ethnic, marginalized, underprivileged, excluded, subservient, dominated communities, and so on. These minority people are identifi ed as ethnic people or janajatis of Nepal. According to Sangram Singh Lama, Janajatis denote the communities or peoples having their distinct cultural identities, own language, religion, custom and culture, whose traditional fabrics are based on equality, who have their own geographical and demographic areas in the country, who have written and/or oral histories of their own, who have the notion of  ‘we’ or ‘us’, who have no pivotal or decisive role to play in the polity and administration exercise of the modern Nepal, who are indigenous or native peoples of Nepal; and who call themselves ‘Janajatis’ or ‘ethnic peoples’ (Lama xxvi). The context of Nepali ethnicity thus embodies distinctive denotation to the universal defi nition of ethnicity as it has adjacent meaning to native or indigenous people. Nepali ethnicity tends to encapsulate a typical circumstance and does not simply mean to the migratory ethnic minorities reckoned as in the United States and in other developed countries but it is related to the native people living here since long ago, and are mostly dominated groups in all forms of state apparatuses. Nepali scholars and writers have begun to affi rm the socio-cultural attributes of Nepali society that contributes to “the strong sense of ethnicity” (Limbu 2010: 7). They have also averred that the state ideology until 1990 has derogatorily characterized as tribe, savage, etc. to Nepali ethnic groups and their cultures, by and large, played role to bring distinction between caste and Other(s). Among them, Dor Bista is the one who intimately observed and identifi ed the real picture of Nepali communities – the pervasiveness of ethnicity, their grievances, acculturations, alienations and frustrations. He fi gures out that “Becoming an expatriate is a common alternative for the frustrated but ambitious ethnic group member” (Bista 1980: 58). The groups with positive elements of value systems in their social and collective practices “are increasingly excluded from the mainstream of society and their values are endangered as another, essentially alien, culture becomes more pervasive” (Bista 2). After the ground-breaking studies of Dor Bahadur Bista in the fi eld of Nepali nationalities, Gobinda Neupane is the one who strongly criticizes the stereotypical ideology of Hindu ruling class. He asserts that state mechanisms of Nepal are “under control of Khases4 and thereby serving for [community] segregation” (Neupane 2005: 30). The questions of ethnic identity and state ideology have become crucial issues for the study of Nepali ethnicity. Ideological state dominations over those ethnic communities can be pointed out from the perspectives of disjunctures and differences between non-ethnic and ethnic, dominant and dominated, privileged and under privileged/marginalized communities. The state ideology, to follow Michel Foucault (1994:60), “always stands in virtual opposition to something else which is supposed to count as truth … which functions as its infrastructure, as its material, economic determinant, etc.” The question of inequality prevailing in the country is also found being raised from different sectors. Nepal Government, until recently, has “deprived ethnic minorities to enjoy their rights guaranteed by the international community and the commitments of Nepal to democracy, human rights, justice, equity and equality” (Bhattachan 2008:69). Similar version of deprivation of Hindu ruling elites is observed by Karl-Heinz Krämer. According to him, “From its inception the unifi ed modern state of Nepal has been the playground of high Hindu elite groups” (Krämer 2003: 227).  Nepali scholars guided by primordialist approach argue that ethnicity is a quest for identity, a kind of ethnic upsurge motivated for gaining political and socio-economic benefi t, whereas, many other instrumentalists, both home and abroad, are close to what Prayag Raj Sharma grudgingly states: “The ethnic politics of Nepal in the 1990s seems to instrumentalists models” (483).  However, David Gellner (2007) argues that the ethnic activism has greater elements of instrumentalism and less primordialism. On the other hand, the academicians from ethnic groups like Krishna B. Bhattachan and Ganesh Man Gurung discard both primordialist and instrumentalist view points
4 “Khas” is a collective term for ruling class including Brahmin, Chhetri, Thakuri and Dasnami
and advocate studying the ethnic movement of Nepal from the perspective of the principles of equality and struggles against discriminations. As a result of “the penetration of Hindu belief and behavior in the life of minorities compelled [ethnic communities] to adopt Hindu names and some aspects of Hindu culture and belief” (Gazala 260). Similarly, “The sacralization process in religion is further supported by elements on which structural basis of identity is constructed. The protection of identity features of minorities from undesired changes remains pivoted due to sacralization process” (Mol 13-14). Furthermore, such process also tends to enforce in religious proselytization. Thus, the act of changing others, Foss and Griffi n (1995:3) claim, “not only establishes the power of the rhetor over others but also devalues the lives and perspectives of those others.” The belief systems and behaviors that others have created for living in the world are “considered by rhetors to be inadeqate or inappropriate and thus in need of change” (ibid.). The imposition of Hindu social order on the non-Hindu people ‘created cleavages within tribal groups whereby some sections adopted caste tenets and even invented genealogies to claim kasi-gotra (Indic) Aryan ancestry as agaisnt lhasa-gotra (Bodic)’ (Gurung 506). According to Harka Gurung, this imposition helped cause status schisms within ethnic communities such as Athar Jat/Bara Jat (Tamang), Bara Thar/Das Thar (Sunuwar), Char Jat/Sorah Jat (Gurung), Kutag/Righin (Bhotiya), Pradhan/Apradhan (Tharu), Pakungthali/Kachare (Chepang), and so on. Niti (based on Mundhum and smriti (based on adoptation of Hinduism) in Limbu people. In his book, Nepal: Problems of Governance (1994), Lok Raj Baral rightly asserts that the ethos of centralization of power goes back to the tradition of “Hindu orthodoxy which was reinforced by the Shah and Rana rulers.” Baral further affi rms that “The Brahmans advised them [rulers] to strictly follow the Manusmriti5 and other Sutras6 that brought about caste divisions within the hierarchical society” (8). While, non-Hindus had their own oral culture, their mythological exhortations that were transmitted mouth to mouth from one generation to the generation next. Legal and social provisions were performed through oral consent. Culture of the indigenous community people was guided by oral tradition, ritual, ceremonies, and day-to-day activities living in the particular region. They had implicit and explicit impact on the activities and lives of the people identifying them as distinctive to the other.  But after the enforcement of caste system, they felt inferior as “such hierarchy assumes the relationships of super-ordination and subordination” (Subba 1999: 4).
Ethnicity in Nepali Context Ethnic identity, for Joane Nagel (1994: 154), “is the result of a dialectical process involving internal and external opinions and processes, as well as the individual’s self-identifi cation and outsiders’ ethnic designations, that is, what you think your ethnicity is versus what they think your ethnicity is.” But this process has nothing to do in the context of Nepal as the group in power subjugated people of other
5 The code of Hindu law 6 Moral and legal treatises groups. It is more one-sided than the kind of two way traffi c. The government in Nepal, Richard Burghart (1984) notes, had consolidated its preeminent claim over the territory of the kingdom and therefore was inclined to look upon the ethnic groups of the kingdom as social bodies ( jat ) rather than as territorial bodies (des). Groups of people, such as the Limbu, who were known in customary usage either as the natives of a country or as the members of a species “were referred to by the government as a species” and, in the 1854 Legal Code the Newari-speaking people of Nepal were referred to collectively as members of the Newar jat, not as the natives of Nepal des. In addition, certain Tibetan groups were referred to collectively as “bhoteko jat” (Burghart 117). Political critic Rishikesh Shah (1992: 2) contends that the country Nepal was ruled by peremptory command of monarch by the will of the ruler, thus, “[The] land has always been regarded as the property of the state or the ruler who represents the state in his person.” Eventually, the ethnic people of Nepal lost their right to land as well as their political autonomy and thereby resulting in displacement of their identity. The condition of such displacement is further underscored by T. B. Subba in the following words. The destabilization of the Kira[n]ts began in 1641 in Sikkim with the establishment of the Namgyal dynasty, and in 1774 in Nepal after the subjugation of the Kira[nt] kingdoms by Prithvi Narayan Shah. Gradually, bit by bit, they lost their political autonomy, their kipat7, their language, their religion and their culture. Those who migrated to Darjeeling and Sikkim even lost their traditional identity as they tried to adjust themselves to new environments. (104) “The Hindus, with their caste-stratifi ed society,” Francis Hamilton, a British writer and diplomat remarks, “are contrasted with the tribal groups that follow a more egalitarian social system, speak distinct languages, have their own traditional dress, customs, mannerisms and beliefs” (1990:24-25) and whom, therefore, should be regarded as non-Hindus. In the view of Sharma (1984), the Hindu-tribal relationship in Nepal has never been characterized as one of total isolation, either in the past or in current times. Moreover, he suggests, “the emphasis on a sharp Hindu-tribal dichotomy in Nepal suffers from the lack of an historical perspective” by which, he means to say that, they are more interrelated than divided and that the notions of “Hindu” and “tribal” here are perhaps better understood “as a continuum than as a dichotomy” (2). During Panchayat system8 (i.e. 1960-1990), ethnic associations were forbidden as public entities in Nepal, as were political parties. At that time, “ethnic associations,” Harald O. Skar (1995: 31) says, “were considered to be “communal” and a hindrance to the process of national unity and integration. At this time, the king was an absolute ruler and considered to be the incarnation of the Hindu God Vishnu.”  The 1962 Constitution of Panchayat system had mentioned that the word “His Majesty” means “His Majesty the King for the time being reigning, being descendant of the Great King Prithivi Narayan Shah and adherent of Aryan culture and Hindu religion”
7 The land granted to the certain community through written document with a Red Seal in which ownership was non-transferable out of the community members. 8 The aristocratic rule endorsed in 1961 by king Mahendra subduing democracy and multiparty system.
(Article 3(1)). And, this Constitution formally declared Nepal as the Hindu nation. The 1962 Constitution was replaced by the Constitution of 1990 characterized by multiparty system under constitutional monarchy and declared a Hindu Kingdom as before prohibiting on conversion from one religion to another. In the history of Nepal, “the Panchayat Raj was deeply entrenched by enforcing monotheistic linguistic, cultural and political policies” (Subedi 2010:4).  After the overthrow of the Partyless Panchayat System in 1990, most of the ethnic associations have been formally recognized as they were allowed to register in the district administration offi ces of the Government. Along with the emergence of the various ethnic associations, an umbrella association known as Federation of Indigenous Nationalities has been formed under which until now fi fty-nine different ethnic associations have got their representation. In addition, Nepal Government has also established an ethnic academy named “National Federation for Development of Indigenous Nationalities” in 1997. Janajati Bikas Samiti (Development of Indigenous Committee) renamed as National Foundation for Development of Indigenous Nationalities (NFDIN), Janajati Mahasangh (Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities-NEFIN) and various community-based organizations of each indigenous communities, for examples, Kirat Yakthung Chumlung (KYC) of Limbus, Kirat Rai Yayokkha of Rais, Kirat Sunuwar Samaj of Sunuwar, Tamang Ghedung of Tamang indigenous community, among others, have been involving in different activities related to ethnic issues after People’s Movement of1990. In accordance with Dev Raj Dahal (2006), an associational life in Nepal seems fl ourished with the vedic age (2000 BC) when dharma (institutional duties), shastras (moral and legal treatises) and shastrartha (philosophical discourses) shaped the knowledge and habits of the subjects and monarchs, rationalized the governing norms of the polity according to barnashram dharma (social division of labor), rajdharma (statecraft) and sanatan dharma (cosmological ordering) and oriented them towards living together and act collectively for peace, public welfare and social harmony. This “essence of dharma,” Dahal avows, “was followed in all the ancient nitishastra (public policy treatises) that were written as a guide to public policy.” According to him, codes of social, political and economic behavior were laid down with the central dharma theme in mind, rather than political or economic expeditiousness. Similarly, he further says that “All legal systems were based on the treatises and their remnants are still found in today’s laws and public policy” (21). Likewise, many other writers and scholars have generated various discursive debates about the roles of State ideology that are affecting ethnic identities specifi cally on social, cultural, religious and linguistic grounds. For an instance, the anthropologist Srinivas who coined the term Sanskritisation and defi ned it as “… the process by which a ‘low’ Hindu caste or tribal group changes its customs, rituals and ideology and way of life in the direction of a high caste” (cited in Turin 1997:187). Because of this, as John Whelpton (2005:56) observes, “Whole complex of values and cultural practices, assimilation to those of high-caste Hindus, a process known as sanskritization, continued slowly throughout the period.” Correspondingly, Höfer (2004:1) in his book on Caste Hierarchy and the State: A Study of the Mulukhi Ain of 1854, has remarked that “Nepal was ruled by the century old hereditary and autocratic Rana aristocracy” and “The Hindu caste hierarchy still had the backing of law and the state’s repressive machinery.” Prayag Raj Sharma here rightly argues that Hindu rulers in Nepal meted out a less than equal treatment to members of the indigenous ethnic groups despite their displays of acculturation. Although the position of the tribal in the varna division was an indeterminate one in the earlier periods, in the later Rana times, they were considered as “belonging to the low Sudra category” (6). It might therefore be the reason what Mahendra Lawoti (2005:23) opines, “More than two third of the population, including the indigenous nationalities (Adibasi Janajati), Dalits (traditional ‘untouchables’) and Madhesis (plain people), are excluded from the infl uential realm of governance in Nepal.” and, hence he adds further, “ethnic… groups are fi ghting for the equal recognition of their languages, religions and cultures as well as equal opportunities in the polity, economy and society” (37). Language and culture are the vehicles and markers for people’s identity which play vital role in the existence of any race in the world. The culture of only Hindu caste people was made pervasive in the country in spite of its social, cultural, religious and linguistic divergences. Penetration policy of their language and culture defi nitely contributed a lot to the deprivation of indigenous people’s language and culture. Various Hindu temples and a few Buddhist stupas were constructed, conserved and promoted in the country. The State has introduced a monogenic faith and religious system in Nepal. Various temples and shrines were constructed for the Hindu people but no Yumahims and Thebahims were constructed for Limbu and Rai ethnic people. Brahma, Vishnu, Maheswar, Ram, Krishna, Laxmi, Saraswoti, Bhagawati, etc of Hindus were worshipped as national Gods and Goddesses but not Tagera Ningwaphu, Lepmuhang, Lahangdona, Paruhung, Sumnima, Hetchhakuppa and so on were worshipped as common Gods and Goddesses of the nation. They were not incorporated as common faith and religion of the State but instead were encroached by Hindu faith, norms and values, religion, culture, and hence, were excluded from the mainstream belief system.  The faith and religion of other non-caste people were undermined. Social code and conduct, norms and values, traditions and rituals, festivals and ceremonies were run under the guidance of Hindu mythologies and philosophies, legends and scriptures. Khas language was made the offi cial language of the nation. It was promoted in both written and oral forms and made compulsion to other mothertongue speakers to speak Khas language. While, indigenous ethnic languages were marginalized and excluded. They were shorn of speaking their own mother-tongue. Similarly, the culture and tradition of indigenous people began to face encroachments through the culture of Hindu caste people. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that all have the right to the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance, either alone or in a community, in public or private. Therefore, even though constitutionally Nepal is a multicultural and religiously secular country, “the separation of religion from the state-professed philosophy of secularism is not evident” and the social structure of Nepal “is still
based on and guided by the old values, norms, customs, and rituals of the Hindu religion” (Thapa 929). The policies and laws as par the Hindu dogma were imposed as the state's principle, Hinduism as the national religion, Nepali as the national language and the culture and values of the dominant groups as the common culture of society despite Nepal’s nature of pluralism and multiplicity. The state has used political suppression, military oppression, social exclusion and economic marginalization to undermine the development of Nepal's indigenous and marginalized groups. As a result, they have no decisive roles in politics, judiciary, executive, civil service and administration in modern Nepal (Baral 1993, Hachhethu 2000 and Pandey 2001). As they lack participation in all spheres of governance including policy making with extremely low participation in politics “which have resulted a very low socio-cultural and economic status” (Lama 18). We fi nd the use of various equivocal concepts and defi nitions of indigenous nationalities. Some use it as corresponding to indigenous people, native people, aborigines, nationalities, while others associate it with ethnicity, tribalism, ethnic minorities, and so on. In the context of Nepal, the term ‘indigenous nationalities’ refers to the non-Hindus, who do not fall under Hindu hierarchy system of caste division but were segregated as Matawali9 in the national code of 1854 and marginalized in state power. Linguistically, four racial groups are in Nepal, viz. Mongoloid, Caucasoid, Dravidian and Proto-Australoid. Beside Caucasoid racial group, all three groups are known as indigenous ethnic nationalities of Nepal. In Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989 (No. 169), Indigenous Peoples (IPs) are broadly defi ned as people in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the population which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions. Similarly, as stated by Asian Development Bank’s policy on indigenous people and poverty reduction programs, “Indigenous people are regarded as those with a social or cultural identity distinct from the dominant or mainstream society, which makes them vulnerable to being disadvantaged in the processes of development” (cited in Plant 2002:7). But generally accepted defi nition of IPs is “those who identify themselves as indigenous and who were the fi rst inhabitants of a territory before any colonization took place” (Maden et al. 11). Concerning to indigenous and tribal peoples in independent countries, Article 1 of ILO Convention No. 169 states that: a. Those Tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations; b. Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical
9 Literally Matuwali means for liquor drinking community. region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of present State boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions. In the context of Nepal, the Task Force formed by the then His Majesty’s of Government for the identifi cation of nationalities had submitted the report in 1996 by identifying 61nationalities. According to this report, each Indigenous Nationality of Nepal has the following characteristics: a distinct collective identity, b) own language, religion, tradition, culture and civilization, c) own traditional egalitarian social structure, d) traditional homeland and geographical area, e) written or oral history, f) having “We” feeling, g) has had no decisive role in the politics and government of modern Nepal, h) who are the indigenous or native peoples of Nepal; and i) who declares itself as ‘Janajati.’ (Indigenous Nationalities Bulletin 16) The invading authorities adopted a harsh divide-and-rule policy during the conquest. The Gorkhalis ultimately divided the Limbu Kirantis into two groups, “the sampriti and the niti: the former were those who had surrendered to Gorkhali power and cultural traditions, while the latter maintained their own traditions” (Dhungel 2006:5). The Gorkhali authorities naturally favoured the sampritis, killing the niti Limbus or forcing them to fl ee their lands. As a result, “much of the niti population migrated towards Sikkim and Bhutan” (ibid) and Limbus were bound to assert the state-given identities of niti and sampriti. Ramesh K. Dhungel asserts that such hegemonic culture has encroached upon the Kirant living space, ensuing the confl icts and subjugation at a rudimentary stage. The cultural identity of any indigenous community was taken as a threat to the national unifi cation by ruling elites until the recent years. The use of Limbu alphabets and script was banned and the possession of Limbu writings outlawed. Eventually, indigenous peoples are “still lacking integration and participation” in the modern democratic Nepali state. Although their situation has improved compared to panchayat times, Karl-Heinz Krämer (2003:228) notes, “the greatest problem is still the attitude of the Nepali state. There is hardly any organization outside the ethnic camp that really wants to understand the ethnic argumentation.” For him, politicians may be talking about participation of ethnic groups and suppressed castes, but the facts speak a different language, and there is hardly any change in attitude in sight. All these groups have in common that they have been disadvantaged in the modern Nepali state in respect to legal rights and to political, social and economic participation (ibid). Moreover, Limbu identity was affected with the use of their fi rst and middle names as they negotiated by adopting Hindu-Aryan fi rst-names such as Ram, Sita, Ramesh, Hari, Shiva, Parbati, etc. and middle-names like Bahadur, Kumar, Prasad, etc. – retaining the Sanskritized overtones. Their identity is thus in crossroad as their language, culture, religion and literature remains in transition of old tradition and new modern set up. Studying on identity change among the Gurung of central Nepal, Alan Macfarlane argues that identities of minority groups of Nepal are under “cultural
pressures” resulting in “the spread of Nepali-medium teaching, the effects of the radio, the growing dominance of the towns” which eroded their language and culture (1987:187). The cultural identity of minority groups is under crisis as their language and religion suffer from domination of Khas-Aryan culture. Indeed, modern Nepal is the product of collective history of ethnic and caste groups “located in a multistructural national hierarchy and are struggling for competitive and egalitarian groups’ identities” (Dahal 7). However, there is a vast gap in identities of Nepali communities. As John Whelpton (2005: 39) observes, being a Nepali then means different things to different Nepalis and we need to be constantly aware of the gap that may exist between offi cial aspirations and the actual feelings of a population divided along ethnic, caste, and class lines. The state ideology as an apparatus for constituting subject positions through the fi eld of representation thus seems to have occasioned such a set of debates and exegeses since Nepal’s ritualized ideology, institutions and traditions have coexisted with the State. With the same ideology, it is thought that there is submersion of cultural heterogeneity within a singular identity of experience, the dictum of “Unity in Diversity” but not suitably perceived it as “Diversity in Unity.”

Conclusion

The accounts of Nepal’s nation building process invite a number of discursive questions. Although Nepal is a multi-national, multi-lingual, multi-religious, and multi-cultural country, this truth has been overlooked by the then authorities. The ruling authorities have endorsed their own culture, language, religion, norms and values in the country with the rhetoric of nationalism. The Country Code of 1854 introduced by Jang Bahadur Rana further ignited this campaign of Hinduizational act of stratifi cation of the communities under hierarchical system. This system of hierarchy was strong strategy for establishing Hindu ideology (which ultimately developed into state ruling ideology) and helped create privileged and under privileged groups in the country.  The assimilationistic notion of state ideology turned into detrimental impacts to the minority groups resulting in the menace of their self-identities. Indigenous nationalities of Nepal were subjugated, underprivileged, marginalized thanks to the lack of access and approach in the state mechanism. For instance, Limbus of eastern Nepal were made compelled to lose their right to Subhangi and Kipat land system which completely ended together with the Land Reform Act of 1964 and cadastral land survey that followed. In fact, the right to autonomy of Limbus was a signifi cant privilege perpetuated from the Sen rulers and the early Shah rulers. As their cultural, socio-political and economic, linguistic and religious life were threatened by state ruling ideology, the minority groups including the Limbus fall under the crises of their identities. The mechanisms that were used in order to occasion, as modus operandi, subordinating identities of others pertaining to time and context and thereby resulting in its fl uid nature. Therefore, they are known as non-Hindus, janajatis or ethnic people, minority groups, and so on. They are thus in a state of transition and incessant fl ux now.