Anglo-Nepalese War
General
1. The Anglo-Nepalese War
(1814 – 1816), sometimes called
the Gorkha War, was fought between Nepal and the British East India Company as a result
of border tensions and ambitious expansionism. When
Nepal was on its expansion
process at that time British had almost colonized India
and they were seeking chance into Nepal also. East India Company
started to claim Seoraj and Butwal belong to them and also put an ultimatum to
vacate within 25 days. However, Nepal
did not vacate the lands (Seoraj and Butwal) as per ultimatum given by British
India Company. So, the magistrate of Gorakhpur
sent force to capture the disputed lands Seoraj and Butwal on April 1814. But
after a few days, Nepali troops were sent from Palpa to recapture Seoraj and
Butwal from British Company. Nepali troops easily recaptured the land and
evicted company troops from that place. This became an immediate reason to
British India Company to fight against Nepal . The governor general of East
India Company formally declared war against Nepal on 1st November
1814. The war ended with the signing of the Treaty
of Sugauli in 1816.
Historical
background
2. For
centuries the three kingdoms of the Kathmandu valley - Kathmandu, Patan and Bhadgaon, (now Bhaktapur), -
had quarrelled amongst themselves and were too concerned with internal rivalry
to pay attention to any potential danger from without. This insularity however
had by 1769, enabled
Prithvi Narayan Shah the king of Gorkha to conquer
the valley, forming the foundations for the modern Kingdom
of Nepal.
3. In 1767, a request to the British for help by the traditional valley
kings under threat from Gorkha expansion resulted in an ill-equipped and
ill-prepared expedition numbering 2,500 lead by Captain Kinloch. The expedition
was a disaster - the Gorkha army easily overpowered those who did not succumb
to malaria or desertion. This ineffectual and token British force not only
provided the Gorkhas with firearms but also filled them with suspicion, causing
some to underestimate their future opponents.
4. This
conquest of the Kathmandu valley was only the
beginning of an explosion of Gorkha power throughout the region. The Gorkha
armies had overrun all of eastern Nepal
by 1773 - by 1788 Gorkha forces had
also annexed some western portions of Sikkim. In the
west, all rulers as far as the Kali River had submitted or been replaced by 1790. Farther west
still, the Kumaon
region and its capital Almora, had also succumbed to the Gorkhas.
5. To the
north however, aggressive raids into Tibet (concerning a
long-standing dispute over trade and control of the mountain passes), finally
forced the Chinese emperor in Peking to act. In 1792 he sent a huge army, expelling the Nepalese out of Tibet to within 5km of their capital at Kathmandu . Acting regent Bahadur Shah, (Prithvi Naryan’s
son), appealed to the British Governor-General
of India ,
Francis
Rawdon-Hastings, Lord Moira for help. Anxious to avoid confrontation with
the Chinese, Lord Moira sent Captain Kirkpatrick as mediator, but before he
arrived the war with China
had finished.
6. The Tibet affair had postponed a previously planned
attack on the Kingdom
of Garhwal , but by 1803 the raja of
Garhwal had also been defeated - he was killed in the struggle and all his land
annexed. Further west, general Amar
Singh Thapa overran lands as far as the Kangra - the
strongest fort in the hill region – and laid siege to it (although by 1809, Ranjit
Singh the ruler of the Sikh state in the Punjab,
had intervened and drove the Nepalese army east of the Sutlej river).
7. The
British were also expanding their sphere of influence. The recent acquisition
of the Nawab of Oudh's lands by the
British East India Company brought the region of Gorakhpur
into the close proximity of the raja of Palpa - the last remaining
independent town within the Gorkha heartlands. Suspicion of the raja’s
collusion with the British led first to his imprisonment by the Gorkhas, then
to his assassination. Bhimsen Thapa the Nepalese Prime Minister (1806 – 1837) installed his own
father as governor of Palpa leading to serious border disputes between the two
powers.
8. These
disputes arose because there was no fixed boundary separating the Gorkhas and
the British - a Border Commission imposed on Nepal by the Governor General
failed to solve the problem. Gorkha raids into the flatlands of the Tarai (a much prized
strip of fertile ground separating the Nepalese hill country from India ) increased tensions - the British felt
their power in the region and their tenuous lines of communication between Calcutta and
the northwest were under threat. Since neither side had any idea where the
border was supposed to be, confrontation between the powers was inevitable.
9. While the
Nepalese had been expanding its empire – Sikkim
in the east, Kumaon and Garhwal in the west and into the British sphere of
influence in Oudh in the south - the British East India Company had
consolidated its position in India
from its main bases of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. The British East India Company was trying to influence
and get hold of the control of Nepal
as soon as they arrived in India .
However, the policy of the then rulers of Nepal prevented this. This British
expansion had already been resisted in parts of India
culminating in the Mahratta Wars, as well as in the Punjab
where Ranjit
Singh had his own empire-building aspirations. It was, therefore,
imperative to the British that the war was quickly and successfully concluded.
The main causes of the war between the East India Company and Nepal were as
follows:-
(a) The successful unification
campaign of Nepal
which was likely to pose threat in the area of interest of the British East
India Company.
(b) The growing military power
of Nepal
which could be dangerous for the East India Company.
(c) The refusal of the rulers of
Nepal
to establish any sort of relationship with East India Company.
(d) The policy of colonization
of the East India Company.
(e) The extensive natural
resources on which the East India Company wanted to get hold.
(f) The aim of the East India
Company to increase its influence in Tibet
and China via land of Nepal .
(g) The existing boarder
disputes between East India Company and Nepal .
Preparation for War
10. When the government
of Nepal realized the
Nepalese had several advantages over the British including knowledge of the
region and recent experience fighting in the mountainous terrain, there was a
mixed opinion in between the policy makers of the government of Nepal whether
or not to go for war. However, the British had numerical superiority and far
more modern weapons.
11. British Preparation. The initial British campaign was to attack on two
fronts across a frontier of more than 1,500km (930miles).Those two fronts were
to be separated by the Mahakali
River . As most of the
Nepalese troops were in the western part of Nepal
for the unification campaign, the British had initial plan the cut off the main
forces in the west so as to make them unable to reinforce and protect Kathmandu
thereby making the situation of Kathmandu
weak.
12. In the
eastern front, Major-General Bennet Marley with some 6500 troops was to advance
from Dinapur to Makawanpur and towards the heart of the valley of Kathmandu .
Major-General John Sullivan Wood was to lead his troops of 4000 troops from Gorakhpur to Butwal-Seoraj and advance to Plapa thereby
isolating the Kathmandu from probable reinforcement from the western part of Nepal . . Further east, on the Sikkim border,
Captain Latter led a small force in a primarily defensive role.
13. Major-General
Rollo Gillespie, with about 4500 troops, led the column from Saharanpur
to Derahdun and Colonel David Ochterlony commanded a column of about 6000
troops in the western front which had planned to advance from Ruper to capture
western part of Nepal .
These columns were pitted against the cream of the Nepalese army under the
command of Amar Singh Thapa.
14. Total of
about 35000 British regular and about 13000 irregular troops were involved in
this mission. All four columns were mainly made up of Indian troops, though
Ochterlony was the only column without a single British infantry battalion. The
Commander-in-Chief of the British forces was Lord Moira.
15. Preparation on Nepalese Side. On the Nepalese side, there was no special
preparation for the war as most of the elite troops were deployed in the far
west. The total strength of the Nepal Army at that time was approximately 14000
only. Most of the soldiers were new recruits with very little or no war
experience also lacked the arms, ammunitions and equipments to face well
trained and equipped East India troops. The
preparation and deployment of Nepalese troops at that time was as follows:-
(a) A
force of 2000 troops under command of Kaji
Bakhtawar Thapa was deployed in and around Bijayapur to counter the
invasion in the eastern part of Nepal .
(b) Col Ranveer Singh Thapa was deployed in
and around Makawanpur with about 4000 troops to block the probable enemy
advance towards the capital city.
(c) Col Ujir Singh was leading a force of
about 3000 soldiers to defend Butwal-Seoraj and Palpa.
(d) Amar Singh Thapa was the overall
commander of the Nepalese troops of more than 5000 soldiers west of Mahakali
river to counter the British invasion in the western part of Nepal .
16. Battle of Nalapani. The campaign started badly. A day
before the Governor-General officially declared war on 1 November
1814, General
Gillespie had been killed trying to take the weakly defended fort at Khalanga
at the Battle of Nalapani. In the interval before
Gillespie’s successor Major-General Gabriel Martindell took over command,
Colonel Sebright Mawby managed to take Khalanga by cutting off its water supplies.
Soon after Martindell arrived to assume command.
17. Battle of Jaithak. The British suffered further setbacks at the
hands of Ranjur Singh Thapa (Amar Singh Thapa’s son), at
the Battle of Jaithak. Martindell eventually reduced
Jaithak to rubble with his guns but, even with vastly superior numbers, he
failed to occupy it for fear of counter-attack.
18. Battle of Jitadh. The generals in the east mirrored this
pusillanimity with both Wood and Marley reluctant to face the enemy. After two
attempts to advance on Butwal, Wood, with superior numbers, feebly retreated
and took up a defensive posture at Gorakhpur.
His compatriot, Major-General Marley, whose 8,000 strong force was supposed to
provide the main striking force on Kathmandu ,
showed even more timidity. After his advance posts at Samanpore and Persa were
wiped out due to lack of support, he was reduced to abject inactivity and, on 10 February
1815, “unable to
endure the irksomeness of his situation . . .took the sudden and extraordinary
resolution in leaving the camp”. He had deserted!
The company’s hopes now rested on the abilities of
Colonel Ochterlony’s force of around 10,000 troops. Unlike the other generals,
Ochterlony showed determination, skill and an ability to adapt to the
circumstances. Although there were no initial decisive encounters, Ochterlony
slowly pushed Amar Singh’s army higher and higher into the mountains until, in
April 1815, the
Gorkha general had been forced into his main fort at Malaun.
19. Battle of Diothal. The ensuing Battle of Dionthal was the decisive moment in
the campaign. Attempts by Amar Singh’s most able lieutenant, Bhakti
Thapa, to dislodge the British from the Dionthal ridge overlooking the
Malaun fort, failed. Although Bhakti Thapa was killed in the action on 16 April, the
fort held out for a while. However, when news arrived announcing that Almora
had fallen to Colonel Jasper Nicolls’ 2,000 strong force of regular sepoys on 26 April,
Amar Singh Thapa realized the hopelessness of the situation and, threatened by
the British guns, surrendered. In recognition of their heroic defences of their
respective forts of Malaun and Jaithak, Ochterlony allowed Amar Singh and his
son Ranjur (who had joined him at Malaun) to return home with their arms and
men. During the campaign Ochterlony was promoted to major general.
33. Surrender
in Almoda. On 23 April 1815, reinforcement sent from Kathmandu
led by Hasti Dal encountered sudden attack and Hasti Dal got killed. Amar Singh
Thapa was surrounded all around by enemy and was waiting for reinforcement.
Another reinforcement led by Chautaria Bam Shah could not do any thing in front
of enemy and compelled to surrender. After that Almoda went to enemy’s hand.
Then Nepalese force came across Mahakali
River . When Kathmandu
Durbar came to know that Nalapani was lost then they sent a letter to Amar
Singh Thapa to have treaty with East India Company giving them disputed land Butwal,
Seoraj and Palpa with other twenty two villages of Bara. If British do not
accept then give them land from Dehradoon to Satalaj. But Amar singh thought of
fighting decisive battle rather than surrendering. On the first week of March
1815, Arty weapons were concentrated against Malau fort and firing continued.
At that time condition was not good in Almoda side too. On 15 May Ram Das, son
of Amar Singh noticed Ochterlony that his father wanted to talk for treaty. Same
day Amar Singh came to know the surrender of Almoda. Then he signed on treaty
paper. This ended the war in western region.
35. After the end of war East India Company
proposed a treaty with Nepal .
In the draft of treaty there were points which were not tolerable for the
nationalist Nepalese. Some Bhardars were against the treaty including Amar
Singh Thapa. Due to this debate the treaty remained unsigned. Then East India
Company again started war against Nepal . The force led by Gen.
Octorlony arrived up to Makawanpur Gadi. At that time they signed the paper of
treaty and was handed over to East India Company which is called “Sugauli
Treaty”.
During Kaji Amar Singh Thapa’s time
there were no any written principles of war as nowadays. Though from the action
taken by Amar Singh Thapa, we can find how he applied principles of war in his
campaign.
(a) Selection
and Maintenance of Aim. As he
was tasked for the expansion to the west, he firmly maintained the aim and
remained successful to extent border up to Satalaj River
during expansion. While Anglo Nepal war he was tasked to defend the western
territory. With all available resources he fought till the date he was told to
defend.
(b) Maintenance
of Morale. Centrally there was
Marwat and Birta system to the soldiers. During that time, there was no
logistic backup like of today; through exploiting the maximum use of local
resources he maintained the morale of the troops. Another aspect is leadership; he exhibited
with his long experience of war and led in front with the troops.
(c) Offensive
Action all the battle of
expansion campaign was offensive. During his long warrior life he took strong
offensive action and as a result, he won the battle with comparatively lesser
troops. Example of this is Siranchowk battle which made him renowned.
(d) Security all plans were secretly made and the Forts
were made to secure man and materials. Tactics like fighting from strong
position, adopting delaying position, camouflage, concealment and deception. At
the last moment when whole troops were in dangerous condition he choose right
decision to save their life.
(e) Surprise in his campaign he had adopted surprise and
deception measures in many battles. Movement at night, surprise attack from
multi direction and concealed position, use of bad weather conditions are the
measure adopted by him.
(f) Concentration
of Force in all offensive
battle soldiers were deployed at decisive points and in defensive battle fight
from fortified Forts. This justifies that concentration of force was taken into
consideration.
(g) Economy of
Effort. War is always expensive
at that time they used to collect money from businessmen, rich men; certain
amount of collected tax had to be used for military purpose. The war used to be
mainly based on improvisation and maximum use of local resources.
(h) Flexibility
Amar Singh Thapa had applied flexibility in his command and control, movement
of the troops, though certain rigidness was also there and once he decided he
used to refuse to change it.
(j) Cooperation. High degree of cooperation he showed in
relation with Royal
Palace . When ever,
however and where ever he had been tasked, he used to take it very positively.
After the death of Bahadur Shah and up to 1804 A.D there was political
instability in Nepal Durbar. In this crisis condition also he had good
cooperation with Durbar. He had good cooperation among his subordinates as well
and fraternity with locals in logistic support was properly maintained.
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